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Abstract
This note investigates how the effect of offshoring on unemployment is influenced
by the wage setting process. We assume staggered wage contracts in an otherwise
standard search and matching model. In this setup, the contract wage depends also
on expected future conditions. We show that more flexibility in the wage contracting
process induces greater offshoring, a decrease in the worker’s job-finding probability
and higher worker’s wage within job spells. Notably, less stickiness leads to a fall
in the rents that firms can extract by producing domestically.
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1 Introduction
The impact of offshoring on domestic labor market outcomes is periodically at the fore-
front of political discussion and is intensely debated among academics. One aspect that
has been widely overlooked, though, is how the wage contracting process shapes the effect
of offshoring on wages and unemployment. Typically, models of offshoring (trade) with
search frictions rely on period-by-period Nash bargaining between firms and workers (e.g.
Davidson et al. 1999, Helpman and Itskhoki 2010, Mitra and Ranjan 2010). However,
patterns of wage setting suggest that a significant share of establishments has a staggered
contract-like behavior (Le Bihan et al. 2012), and firm-level survey data indicate that
the degree of wage stickiness varies across countries (Druant et al. 2012). In view of this
evidence, we depart from the conventional assumption of period-by-period Nash bargain-
ing and build a two-country (West-East) general equilibrium model where unemployment
arises in the West due to search costs, and allow for a staggered multi-period wage con-
tracting structure in the spirit of Gertler and Trigari 2009. That is, only a fraction of
firms and workers re-set wages in any given period, and employment terms are negotiated
only periodically. This setup allows us to focus on the impact of wage stickiness on the
hiring rate and the contract wage, and the role that these play in shaping the effect of
offshoring on the worker’s job-finding probability.
We show that less stickiness in wage setting (more frequent renegotiations) reduces
firms share of the surplus a job generates1 in the West, inducing more offshoring to the
detriment of domestic employment. One main implication is that more flexibility in
the wage setting process exacerbates the effect of offshoring on domestic unemployment.
Another intriguing implication is that stickiness in the contract wage confers an advantage
to firms, as it allows to extract more rents by producing domestically. Overall, our results
have implications for the design and calibration of offshoring (trade) models with search-
and-matching frictions. The wage contracting process differs across countries implying
different labor market responses to offshoring (trade) shocks. An interesting avenue for
future research would be to include a business cycle component into the model.
2 The Model
There are two countries East (o) and West (d), with L identical households equally split
across the two locations, L = Ld + Lo, and labor is immobile. In the East there is
perfect competition in the labor market and full employment, while in the West there is
unemployment due to search frictions. In the interest of conciseness, we concentrate on
the characterization of firms and on the wage and hiring decisions.2
A final good Y is manufactured by using a continuum of intermediate inputs xij, where
j ∈ {h, o} denotes whether xi is produced domestically, h, or offshored, o. The production
1This result is consistent with Gottfries 2017, which shows that in a model of on-the-job search,
calibrated using US data, less frequent renegotiations are associated with lower workers bargaining power.
2Typically, this literature adopts a representative family setup, to ensure perfect consumption insur-
ance. See Rogerson and Shimer 2011.
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function is
Y = E
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where Aj is a measure of intermediates used from location j and σ ≡ 11−α is the elasticity
of substitution between intermediates. Also, E ≡ A 2α−1α defines the state of technology
in the final good sector. The latter is perfectly competitive. Profit maximization yields
the (inverse) demand curve for intermediates
pij = PE
αY 1−αxα−1ij (2)
where P is the final good price index, which is the numeraire 1 =
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Each intermediate manufacturer produces one variety i, using a constant returns to scale
technology regardless of the location of production
xij = lij (3)
where lij is the number of workers employed by firm i in location j.
While the labor market in the East is frictionless, in the West is imperfect due to
wage rigidity/stickiness (as explained later). Therefore the wage in the East, wio, equals
marginal costs. In the West, firms hire workers at a rate hid and incur a quadratic cost.
The marginal costs of a firm operating in the West is
c˜ij =
{
wio if j = o
wid +
γ
2
h2id if j = d
(4)
The firm intra-temporal profits maximization problem reads as, piij = pijxij − c˜ijlij. From
the f.o.c follows that firms charge at a mark-up over marginal costs (c˜ij)
pij =
c˜ij
α
(5)
Using (5), the profit function is
piij = (1− α)pijxij = (1− α)EαY 1−αxαij (6)
Firms are subject to a fixed costs of entry µ and a fixed costs of offshoring ζ . Let Vj be
the value of a firm located in country j. Assuming free entry in the domestic market and
in the offshoring market implies, respectively
Vd ≥ µ and Vo − Vd ≥ ζ (7)
The instantaneous return from owning the firm is rVj = pij + V˙j. Accordingly, in equilib-
rium
rVd = pid and rVo = pio (8)
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The above, together with (7), determines the return to entry into the domestic location
and into the offshoring location, respectively
r =
pid
µ
and r =
pio − pid
ζ
(9)
Since the interest rate has to be equal for both entry conditions, it follows that
pio
pid
=
ζ + µ
µ
(10)
Using (6) and (3) in (10), yields (
lo
ld
)α
=
ζ + µ
µ
(11)
In equilibrium the labor demand in the West must be equal to the number of employed
workers in the West, i.e.
(1− u)Ld =
∫ Ad
0
liddi = (1− k)Ald (12)
where k represents the share of offshore production in total production, i.e. k ≡ Ao
Ao+Ad
.
Using (12) in (11), and Lo =
∫ Ao
0
liodi = kAlo, we obtain an expression relating equilibrium
unemployment to the degree of offshoring[
Lo
1−k
k
(1− u)Ld
]α
=
ζ + µ
µ
(13)
For future reference we derive the marginal product of labor
flj = αE
αY 1−αlα−1j = αEA
1−α
α [(1− k)xαd + kxαo ]
1−α
α lα−1j (14)
Using (2) and (11), we can rewrite (14) as
fld = αEA
1−α
α
[
1 + k
ζ
µ
] 1−α
α
(15)
which increases in the extent of offshoring.
The Firm’s Hiring Decision
In the West, wage rigidities come from search costs a la Mortensen and Pissarides,
however, we modify their approach to allow for multi period wage contracting. We follow
Gertler and Trigari 2009 and assume that only a subset of firms and workers negotiate
a per-period wage contract. Specifically, each period a firm and its workers face a fixed
exogenous probability 1 − λ that it may re-negotiate its wage, where the parameter λ is
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a proxy of wage stickiness. Furthermore, each wage contract is negotiated between a firm
and its existing workforce. By implication, workers hired in-between wage settlements
receive the existing wage.
To ease notation, when unambiguous, we drop the subscript d, and define the hiring
rate as
hi,t =
qtvt
lt
(16)
where qt is the firm’s probability to fill a vacancy and vt is the number of vacancies a firm
posts. The workers employed in period t by firm i is
li,t = ρli,t−1 + qt−1vt−1 (17)
where ρ is the exogenous job separation rate. Hence, from (17) and (16), the firm’s
employment equation equals
li,t+1 = ρli,t + hi,tli,t (18)
The value of a firm reads as
Vit = xitpit − witlit − γ
2
h2itlit + βEtΛt,t+1Vt+1 (19)
where β is the subjective discount factor, Λ is the marginal rate of substitution and
βEtΛt,t+1 is interpreted as the firm’s discount rate. Therefore, the term βEtΛt,t+1Vt+1 is
the expected discounted future value of the firm. The marginal benefit for the firm of
adding an additional worker is
Jit = flt − wit − γ
2
h2it + β(ρ+ ht)EtΛt,t+1Jit+1 (20)
where Jit ≡ ∂Vit∂lit . Then, the f.o.c for the hiring rate
∂
∂Vit
∂lit
∂hit
= 0, implies−γhit+βEtΛt,t+1 ∂Vit+1∂lit+1 =
0, which using (17) in (16) yields the following forward looking difference equation for the
hiring rate in the West
γhidt = βEdtΛt,t+1
[
fldt+1 − widt+1 + γ
2
h2idt+1 + ργhidt+1
]
(21)
The above depends on the discounted stream of future surplus from the marginal worker,
that is the sum of net earning from a new hire plus savings on adjustment costs plus the
future new hire times the survival rate.
Wage Bargaining
The bargaining problem is to choose the contract wage that maximizes the Nash
product
Hηi,tJ
1−η
i,t (22)
s.t. wd,t+1 =
wd,t with probability λ
w∗d,t+1 with probability 1− λ
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where w∗d,t+1 is the wage in the subsequent period if the firm is able to renegotiate. The
term Jit is the discounted expected marginal benefit of hiring a worker ( 20). The term
Hit = wit − b + βEtΛt,t+1 [ρHi,t+1 − stHx,t+1] represents the worker’s surplus at a firm i,
where b is the unemployment benefit, st is the probability for an unemployed to find a
job, and Hx,t+1. is the workers surplus conditional on being a new hire. The parameter η
denotes the bargaining power of the workers. The solution to the problem is
w∗d,t = χ
[
fld +
γ
2
h2id
]
+ (1− χ) [b+ stβEtΛt,t+1Hx,t+1] (23)
The contract wage is a convex combination of what a worker contributes to a match
and what she looses by accepting a job, where the weight depends on the worker’s rela-
tive horizon-adjusted bargaining power, χ ≡ η
η+(1−η)θ/ . The workers contribution is the
marginal product of labor plus the savings on adjustment costs. The workers loss from
accepting is the unemployment benefit plus the expected discounted gain of moving from
unemployment this period to employment next period. Finally, the weight χ depends not
only on the workers bargaining power η but also on the differential firm/worker horizon,
reflected in θ/. The term t ≡ ∂Ht∂wt = 1 + λβρEtΛt,t+1t+1 is the worker’s cumulative dis-
count factor, and the term θt ≡ − ∂Jt∂wt = 1+λβ(ρ+ht)EtΛt,t+1θt+1 is the firm’s cumulative
discount factor. Since ht > 0, it follows that θt > t and increases in λ proportionally
more. The key feature of (23) is that the contract wage depends also on the expected
future conditions. And since firms care about the implication of the contract wage for
future hires while workers do not, stickiness tilts the effective bargaining power towards
the firm. As a result, firms share of the surplus a job generates increases with stickiness.
3 Equilibrium
We focus our analysis on the steady state. The key labor market relationships are the
hiring condition and the wage bargain equation, which in steady state read as, respectively
γh = β
[
fld − wd + γ
2
h2 + ργh
]
(24)
wd = χ
[
fld +
γ
2
h2 + sγh
]
+ (1− χ) b (25)
In the vicinity of the steady state, the hiring rate (24) decreases in the wage, while
equation (25) implies that the wage is increasing in the hiring rate.3 Also, in steady state,
new hires by firms equal the number of unemployed workers who find jobs
h(1− u) = su (26)
and the hiring rate is equal to the job separation rate
h = 1− ρ (27)
3Note that w is in addition increasing in the probability of finding a job s.
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Equations (24), (25) and (27) together determine wd, k and s. Given wd and k the
equilibrium value of r is determined by (8). Given s and k, the equilibrium unemployment
rate and vacancies are pinned down, respectively, by (13) and the matching function
su = σmu
σv1−σ. By use of (13) into the matching function we obtain an expression
relating s to k
s = σmh
1−σ
 1−kk LoLd
(
µ
ζ+µ
)1/α
1− 1−k
k
Lo
Ld
(
µ
ζ+µ
)1/α

1−σ
L1−σd q
σ−1 (28)
The probability for an unemployed worker to find a job is decreasing in the degree of
offshoring, while the unemployment rate u = 1− 1−k
k
Lo
Ld
(
µ
ζ+µ
)1/α
is increasing in k.
4 Wage Stickiness and Offshoring
Equating (24) and (25), and differentiating with respect to k and l we obtain
dk
dλ
=
[
fld +
γ
2
h2 + sγh− b] ∂χ
∂λ
(1− χ) ∂fld
∂k
− χγh ∂s
∂k
< 0 (29)
implying that lower wage stickiness (λ) increases the degree of offshoring. Totally differ-
entiating the wage equation (25) we obtain
dwd
dλ
=
[
fld +
γ
2
h2 + sγh− b
] ∂χ
∂λ
+ χ
[
∂fld
∂k
+
∂s
∂k
γh
]
dk
dλ
(30)
The first term on the r.h.s of (30) captures the effect of stickiness through the workers
adjusted bargaining power (∂χ
∂λ
< 0) while the second term relates to the effect of stickiness
through offshoring. The sign of the term in squared brackets pre-multiplying dk
dλ
depends
on two opposing forces: the effect of offshoring on marginal product (∂fld
∂k
> 0) and on
the probability of finding a job ( ∂s
∂k
< 0), respectively. By substituting (29) into (30), and
simplifying, it can be easily checked that dwd
dλ
= ∂χ
∂λ
{
[fld+ γ2 h2+sγh−b]
(
∂fld
∂k
)
(1−χ) ∂fld
∂k
−χγh ∂s
∂k
}
< 0. Finally,
the effect on unemployment is measured by differentiating (13), i.e.
du
dλ
=
1
k2
Lo
Ld
(
µ
ζ + µ
)α
dk
dλ
< 0
Altogether our results suggest that less stickiness in the wage contracting process brings
about greater offshoring to the detriment of local employment, while inducing increases
in domestic wages. Intuitively, more frequent wage contracting leads to a reduction in the
rents that firms can extract by producing domestically making offshoring more attractive,
and eventually inducing higher domestic unemployment. It is worth noticing that these
effects are amplified the closer we move to the case of period-by-period wage bargaining (
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λ = 0). And that other changes in labor market institutions, for instance measures that
reduce firms search costs or unemployment benefits, may help to counteract the negative
effect of offshoring. Interestingly, stickiness in the contract wage confers an advantage to
firms, as it allows to extract more rents by producing domestically.
5 Conclusions
In this note we have presented a tractable theoretical model to study the interaction be-
tween domestic wage agreements and employment when firms have the option to offshore
production. We have shown that more flexibility in the wage contracting process induces
greater offshoring, a decrease in the worker’s job-finding probability and higher worker’s
wage within job spells. One intriguing result is that less stickiness in the wage contracting
leads to a reduction in the rents that firms can extract by producing domestically. In this
exercise, we have considered only one type of worker. Our conjecture is that with two
types of workers the main mechanisms will carry over, reinforcing the effect of offshoring
on the skill premium and on the sectorial composition of employment.
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